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ABSTRACT
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different
forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns
to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college stu-
dents, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these
markets, externalities such as complementarities and peer
effects severely complicate the preference ordering of each
agent. Further, research has shown that externalities lead
to serious problems for market stability and for developing
efficient algorithms to find stable matchings.
In this paper we make the observation that peer effects
are often the result of underlying social connections, and we
explore a formulation of the many-to-one matching market
where peer effects are derived from an underlying social net-
work. The key feature of our model is that it captures peer
effects and complementarities using utility functions, rather
than traditional preference ordering. With this model and
considering pairwise stability, we prove that stable match-
ings always exist and characterize the set of stable match-
ings in terms of social welfare. We also give distributed algo-
rithms that are guaranteed to converge to a stable matching.
To assess the competitive ratio of these algorithms and to
more generally characterize the efficiency of matching mar-
kets with externalities, we prove general bounds on how far
the welfare of the worst-case stable matching can be from the
welfare of the optimal matching, and find that the structure
of the social network (e.g. how well clustered the network
is) plays a large role.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous forms,
such as college admissions, the national medical residency
program, freshman housing assignment, as well as the classic
firms-and-workers market. These markets are widely studied
in academia and also widely deployed in practice, and have
been applied to other areas, such as FCC spectrum allocation
and supply chain networks [3, 22]
In the conventional formulation, matching markets consist
of two sets of agents, such as medical interns and hospitals,
each of which have preferences over the agents to which they
are matched. In such settings it is important that matchings
are ‘stable’ in the sense that agents do not have incentive to
change assignments after being matched. The seminal paper
on matching markets was by Gale and Shapley [13], and fol-
lowing this work an enormous literature has grown, e.g., [21,
28, 29, 30] and the references therein. Further, variations
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on Gale and Shapley’s original algorithm for finding a sta-
ble matching are in use by the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP), which matches medical school graduates
to residency positions at hospitals [27].
However, there are problems with many of the applica-
tions of matching markets in practice. For example, couples
participating in the NRMP often reject their matches and
search outside the system. In housing assignment markets
where college students are asked to list their preferences over
housing options, there is often collusion among friends to list
the same preference order for houses. These two examples
highlight that ‘peer effects’, whether just couples or a more
general set of friends, often play a significant role in many-
to-one matchings. That is, agents care not only where they
are matched, but also which other agents are matched to
the same place. Similarly, ‘complementarities’ often play a
role on the other side of the market. For example, hospitals
and colleges care not only about which individual students
are assigned to them, but also that the group has a certain
diversity, e.g., of different specializations.
As a result of the issues highlighted above, there is a grow-
ing literature studying many-to-one matchings with external-
ities (i.e., peer effects and complementarities) [9, 14, 19, 20,
23, 25, 2, 10, 31] and the research has found that designing
matching mechanisms is significantly more challenging when
externalities are considered. In fact, even determining the
existence of stable matchings in the presence of externalities
has been difficult.
The reason for the difficulty is that there is no longer
a guarantee that a stable many-to-one matching will exist
when agents care about more than their own matching [27,
29], and, if a stable matching does exist, it can be compu-
tationally difficult to find [26]. Consequently, most research
has focused on identifying when stable matchings do and
do not exist. Papers have proceeded by constraining the
matching problem through restrictions of the possible pref-
erence orderings, [9, 14, 19, 20, 23, 25], and by considered
variations on the standard notion of stability [2, 10, 31]. Our
paper also considers a restriction of the model, described in
the following.
The key idea of this paper is that peer effects are often the
result of an underlying social network. That is, when agents
care about where other agents are matched, it is often be-
cause they are friends. With this in mind, we construct a
model in Section 2 that includes a weighted, undirected so-
cial network graph and allows agents to have utilities (which
implicitly defines their preference ordering) that depend on
where neighbors in the graph are assigned. The model is
motivated by [2], which also considers peer effects defined by
a social network but focuses on one-sided matching markets
rather than two-sided matching markets. As in [2, 3, 12], we
focus on pairwise-stable matchings, where a matching is sta-
ble if there do not exist agents that can (and want to) switch
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positions – see Section 2 for a detailed definition of pairwise-
stability. We note that this is not a generalization of the
traditional notion of stability of [13]; rather, it is a weaker
form of stability, but one that is still relevant to many sit-
uations. Note that it is similar to the notion of exchange
stability in [1, 6, 7, 16], which consider the stable marriage
and stable roommate problem, but is defined in the context
of a two-sided market.
Given our model of peer effects, the focus of the paper
is then on characterizing the set of pairwise-stable match-
ings. Our results concern (i) the existence of pairwise-stable
matchings, (ii) algorithms for finding pairwise-stable match-
ings, and (iii) the efficiency of pairwise-stable matchings (in
terms of social welfare).
With respect to the existence of pairwise-stable match-
ings (Section 3), it is not difficult to show that in our model
pairwise-stable matchings always exist. Further, the match-
ing that maximizes social welfare is guaranteed to be pairwise-
stable. Given the contrast to the negative results that are
common for many-to-one matchings, e.g., [10, 26, 27], these
results are perhaps surprising. Further, the results on char-
acterizing the existence of pairwise-stable matchings nat-
urally suggest two simple algorithms for finding pairwise-
stable matchings, which we discuss in Section 4.
With respect to the efficiency of pairwise-stable matchings
(Section 5), results are not as easy to obtain. In this context,
we limit our focus to one-sided matching markets, but as a
result we are able to attain bounds on the ratio of the welfare
of the optimal matching to that of the worst stable matching,
i.e., the ‘price of anarchy’. We also demonstrate cases where
these bounds are tight. When considering only one-sided
markets, our model becomes similar to hedonic coalition for-
mation, but with several key differences, as highlighted in
Section 5. Our results (Theorems 3 and 4) show that the
price of anarchy does not depend on the number of, say, in-
terns, but does grow with the number of, say, hospitals –
though the growth is typically sublinear. Further, we ob-
serve that the impact of the structure of the social network
on the price of anarchy happens only through the clustering
of the network, which is well understood in the context of
social networks, e.g., [17, 33]. Finally, it turns out that the
price of anarchy has a dual interpretation in our context;
in addition to providing a bound on the inefficiency caused
by enforcing pairwise-stability, it turns out to also provide a
bound on the loss of efficiency due to peer effects.
2. MODEL AND NOTATION
To begin, we define the model we use to study many-to-one
matchings with peer effects and complementarities. There
are four components to the model, which we describe in turn:
(i) basic notation for discussing matchings; (ii) the model for
agent utilities, which captures both peer effects and comple-
mentarities; (iii) the notion of stability we consider; and (iv)
the notion of social welfare we consider.
To provide a consistent language for discussing many-to-
one matchings, throughout this paper we use the setting
of matching incoming undergraduate students to residential
houses, which occurs yearly at Caltech and other universities.
In this setting many students are matched to each house, and
the students have preferences over the houses, but also have
peer effects as a result of wanting to be matched to the same
house as their friends. Similarly, the houses have preferences
over the students, but there are additional complementarities
due to goals such as maintaining diversity. It is clear that
stability is a key goal of this “housing assignment” problem.
Notation for many-to-one matchings.
Using the language of the housing assignment problem, we
define two finite and disjoint sets, H = {h1, . . . , hm} and S =
{s1, . . . , sn} denoting the houses and students, respectively.
For each house, there exists a positive integer quota qh which
indicates the number of positions a house has to offer. The
quota for each house may be different.
A matching µ describes the assignment of students to
houses such that students are matched to only one house,
while houses are matched to multiple students. More for-
mally:
Definition 1. A matching is a subset µ ⊆ S × H such
that |µ(s)| = 1 and |µ(h)| = qh, where µ(s) = {h ∈ H :
(s, h) ∈ µ} and µ(h) = {s ∈ S : (s, h) ∈ µ}.1
Note that we use µ2(s) to denote the set of student s’s house-
mates (students also in house µ(s)).
Friendship network.
The friendship network among the students is modeled by
a weighted graph, G = (V,E,w) where V = S and the rela-
tionships between students are represented by the weights of
the edges connecting nodes. The strength of a relationship
between two students s and t is represented by the weight
of that edge, denoted by w(s, t) ∈ R+ ∪ {0}. We require
that the graph is undirected, i.e., the adjacency matrix is
symmetric so that w(s, t) = w(t, s) for all s, t.
Additionally, we define a few metrics quantifying the graph
structure and its role in the matching. Let the total weight of
the graph be denoted by |E| := 1
2
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈S w(s, t). Fur-
ther, let the weight of edges connecting houses h and g under
matching µ be denoted by Ehg(µ) :=
∑
s∈µ(h)
∑
t∈µ(g) w(s, t).
Note that in the case of edges within the same house Ehh(µ) :=
1
2
∑
s∈µ(h)
∑
t∈µ(h) w(s, t). Finally, let the weight of edges
that are within the houses of a particular matching µ be
denoted by Ein(µ) :=
∑
h∈H Ehh(µ).
Agent utility functions.
In our model, each agent derives some utility from a partic-
ular matching and an agent (student or house) always strictly
prefers matchings that give a strictly higher utility and is
indifferent between matchings that give equal utility. This
setup differs from the traditional notion of ‘preference or-
derings’ [13, 29], but is not uncommon [1, 2, 3, 5, 12]. It
is through the definitions of the utility functions that we
model peer effects (for students) and complementarities (for
houses).
Under our model, students derive benefit both from (i)
the house they are assigned to and (ii) their peers that are
assigned to the same house. We model each house h as hav-
ing an objective desirability of Dh ∈ R+ ∪ {0}, independent
of the student being considered. This leads to a utility for
student s under matching µ of
Us(µ) := Dµ(s) +
∑
t∈µ2(s)
w(s, t) (1)
where w(s, t) is the weight of the edge between s and t in
the friendship graph and Dh is utility derived by student s
for house h.2 Note that Dµ(s) = Dµ(t) if students s and t
are matched to the same house, i.e., if µ(s) = µ(t). The
1If the number of students in µ(h), say r, is less than qh,
then µ(h) contains qh − r copies of h.
2We note that the utility of any dummy roommates (such as
what happens when a house’s quota is not met), is simply
Us(µ) = 0 if s is a copy of h. Dummy roommates are not
real – they simply represent an open spot, and thus gain no
utility from the matching.
students cannot value the same house differently, since Dh
is the objective desirability of house h.
Similarly, the utility of a house h under matching µ is
modeled by
Uh(µ) := D
h
µ(h), (2)
where Dhσ denotes the desirability of a particular set of stu-
dents σ for house h (the utility house h derives from being
matched to the set of students σ). Note that this definition
of utility allows general phenomena such as heterogeneous
house preferences over groups of students.
Pairwise stability.
The notion of stability we consider in this setting is termed
“pairwise stability” and is similar to that of [2, 3, 12]. It can
be considered to be a slightly weaker notion of stability than
the traditional one used in works such as [13].
To define pairwise stability, it is convenient to first define
a swap matching µts in which students s and t switch places
while keeping all other students’ assignments the same.
Definition 2. A swap matching µts = {µ\{(s, h), (t, g)}}∪
{(s, g), (t, h)}.
Note that the agents directly involved in the swap are the
two students switching places and their respective houses –
all other matchings remain the same. This type of swap
is similar to the “exchange” considered in [1, 6, 7, 16], but
our notion of pairwise-stability is slightly different than the
“exchange-stability” considered for the stable marriage and
stable roommate problems, and, as a result, while an exchange-
stable matching may not exist in either the stable marriage
or stable roommate problem, we show in Section 3 that a
pairwise-stable matching will always exist for the housing
assignment problem.
Definition 3. A matching µ is pairwise-stable (PS) if
and only if there does not exist a pair of students (s, t) such
that:
(i) ∀ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)}, Ui(µts) ≥ Ui(µ) and
(ii) ∃ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)} such that Ui(µts) > Ui(µ)
The definition of pairwise-stability implies that a swap
matching in which all agents involved are indifferent is pairwise-
stable. This avoids looping between equivalent matchings.
Note that the above definition implies that if two students
want to switch between two houses, the houses involved must
“approve” the swap or if two houses want to switch two stu-
dents, the students involved must agree to the swap. At least
one agent in the quadruplet (two students, two houses) must
strictly improve; the others must at least be indifferent. This
is natural for the house assignment problem and many other
many-to-one matching markets, but would be less appropri-
ate for some other settings, such as the college-admissions
model.
Social welfare.
One key focus of this paper is to develop an understanding
of the “efficiency loss” that results from enforcing stability of
assignments in matching markets. We measure the efficiency
loss in terms of the “social welfare”, which we define as fol-
lows:
W (µ) :=
∑
s∈S
Us(µ) +
∑
h∈H
Uh(µ)
Using this definition of social welfare, the efficiency loss
can be quantified using the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and
Price of Stability (PoS). Specifically, the PoA (PoS) is the
ratio of the optimal social welfare over all matchings, not
necessarily stable, to the minimum (maximum) social wel-
fare over all stable matchings. Understanding the PoA and
PoS is the focus of Section 5.
3. EXISTENCE OF STABLE MATCHINGS
We begin by focusing on the existence of pairwise sta-
ble matchings. In most prior work, matching markets with
externalities do not have guaranteed existence of a stable
matching. For example, in the presence of couples on the
resident side of the hospital matching market, the NRMP
algorithm may fail to have a stable outcome [27], [29], and
even if a stable matching does exist, it may be NP-hard to
find [26].
In contrast to the prior literature discussed above, we
prove that a pairwise stable matching always exists in the
model considered in this paper. Note that a local maximum
of W (µ) is a matching µ for which there exists no matching
µ′ which is obtained from µ by swapping the assignment of
exactly two students and has W (µ′) > W (µ).
Theorem 1. All local maxima of W are pairwise stable.
Note, however, that not all pairwise-stable matchings are
local maxima of W (µ).3
The contrast between Theorem 1 and the results such as
[27] and [29] can be explained by considering a few aspects
of the model we study. In particular, the focus on pairwise
stability and the assumption that the social network graph
is symmetric are key to guaranteeing existence. We omit
the exact proof of Theorem 1 here; see Appendix A for the
detailed proof. Basically, each swap results in a Pareto im-
provement for the agents involved in the swap, as implied by
the definition of pairwise stability. Specifically,
Lemma 2. Any swap matching µts for which
(i) ∀ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)}, Ui(µts) ≥ Ui(µ), and
(ii) ∃ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)} with Ui(µts) > Ui(µ)
has W (µts) > W (µ).
For all of the other agents, a non-negative change in util-
ity follows from the symmetry of the graph. As the set of
matchings is finite, the existence of a pairwise-stable match-
ing follows directly from Theorem 1.
4. FINDING STABLE MATCHINGS
In the previous section we have shown that a pairwise-
stable matching will always exist and, moreover, that so-
cially optimal matchings are always pairwise-stable. In this
section, we turn to the task of developing algorithms for find-
ing stable matchings. In particular, two natural algorithms
follow immediately from our analysis.
Algorithm 1 (Greedy)
while i ≤ maxIterations do
Search for “approved” swap µts
µ← µts
i← i+ 1
end while
Algorithm 1 proceeds by greedily considering “approved”
swaps among students/houses that improve the social wel-
fare. Note that this algorithm can easily be implemented
3Such a case arises when one student, for example, refuses
a swap as her utility would decrease, but the other student
involved stands to benefit a great deal from such a swap. If
the swap were forced, the total social welfare could increase,
but only at the expense of the first student.
in a distributed manner, and loosely models the process by
which individuals adjust a matching that is not stable.
Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 immediately give that this al-
gorithm will converge to a stable matching, since the social
welfare strictly improves with each iteration, and all local
maxima of W are stable matchings. Note that Algorithm
1 is not guaranteed to converge to the socially optimal sta-
ble matching; it will likely find just a local maxima of W .
Also, note that each iteration of the algorithm above can in-
volve searching many pairs of students (and houses) for an
“approved” swap.
The second algorithm we consider again seeks to optimize
W , this time using a MCMC heat bath. In this algorithm
we start with a random initial matching and at each itera-
tion swap a random pair of students with a probability that
depends on the change in social welfare: a positive change
yields a probability of swapping larger than 1/2 and vice–
versa. Algorithm 2 therefore can emerge from a local max-
imum. The algorithm keeps track of the “best” matching
found so far, even as it moves to worse matchings. If Algo-
rithm 2 is run sufficiently long (perhaps exponential time)
it can find the optimal stable matching [15]. However, there
is no guarantee that the best matching encountered in fi-
nite time is even stable, a situation that can be remedied by
applying the greedy algorithm to this matching. Simulation
results show the superiority of Algorithm 2 to Algorithm 1 in
terms of welfare, at the expense of an increase in the number
of computations.
Algorithm 2 MCMC
while i ≤ maxIterations do
Pick random pair of students {s, t}
PT =
1
1+e−T (W (µts)−W (µ))
µ← µts with probability PT
if (W (µts) > Wbest) then
Wbest = W (µ
t
s)
end if
i← i+ 1
end while
To illustrate the performance of these two natural algo-
rithms, we use two social network data sets.
The first data set is from the Caltech Project [11]. This
data set is an undirected graph representing the friendship
links among the undergraduates at the California Institute
of Technology in 2010. It includes approximately 900 nodes
and 3500 edges. To illustrate the algorithms, we created
10 houses and assigned them desirability values uniformly
distributed from 0 to 10. For the other side of the market,
each student is assigned a score by each house, uniformly
distributed from 0 to 10. Each algorithm is run using the
same initial values, and the results are shown in Figure 1.
The second data set we use is from voting records for ad-
min promotion at Wikipedia. Edges in the dataset represent
votes for or against a user by another user. For simplicity,
we treated the directed graph as undirected, resulting in ap-
proximately 7000 nodes and 100000 edges. To illustrate the
algorithms, we created 71 houses and assigned them uniform
random values between 0 and 10 as before. For the other side
of the market, each users is assigned a score by each house,
uniformly distributed from 0 to 10, also as before. Each al-
gorithm is run using the same initial values, and the results
are shown in Figure 2.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that with both networks, Algo-
rithm 2 has longer running time than Algorithm 1, which
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Figure 1: Illustration of the performance of Algorithms 1
and 2 on the Caltech Social Network
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Figure 2: Illustration of the performance of Algorithms 1
and 2 on the Wikipedia Voting network
converges quickly.4 The y-axis in all figures shows the so-
cial welfare of the matching at each iteration. As expected,
Algorithm 1 converges to a sub-optimal matching for both
networks, but this value is of the same order of magnitude
as that found by Algorithm 2.
5. EFFICIENCY OF STABLE MATCHINGS
To this point, we have focused on the existence of pairwise-
stable matchings and how to find them. In this section our
focus is on the “efficiency loss” due to stability in a matching
market and the role peer effects play in this efficiency loss.
We measure the efficiency loss in a matching market using
the price of stability (PoS) and the price of anarchy (PoA) as
defined in Section 2. Interestingly, the price of anarchy has
multiple interpretations in the context of this paper. First, as
is standard, it measures the worst-case loss of social welfare
that results due to enforcing pairwise-stability. Second, it
provides a competitive ratio for Algorithm 1 for finding a
stable matching, since Algorithm 1 provides no guarantee
about which pairwise-stable matching it will find. Third, we
show later that the price of anarchy also has an interpretation
as capturing the efficiency lost due to peer effects.
The results in this section all require one additional sim-
plifying assumption to our model: complementarities are ig-
nored and only peer effects are considered. Specifically, we
assume, for all of our PoA results, Uh(µ) = 0, and thus
W (µ) =
∑
s∈S Us(µ). Under this assumption, the market is
one-sided, with only students participating. This assumption
is limiting, but there are still many settings within which the
model is appropriate. Two examples are the housing assign-
ment problem in the case when students can swap positions
without needing house approval, and the assignment of fac-
ulty to offices as discussed in [2]. We note that in addition,
4We note that in the greedy algorithm, an “iteration” can
take much more time to complete than one “iteration” of
the MCMC heat bath. Even with this effect, however, the
MCMC takes longer than the greedy algorithm.
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Figure 3: Arbitrarily bad pairwise-stable matching
we assume that the quotas of each house are exactly satisfied;
i.e., there are no empty positions in any of the houses.
5.1 Related models
When the housing assignment problem is restricted to a
one-sided market involving only students, we note that it
becomes very similar to both (i) a hedonic coalition forma-
tion game with symmetric additively separable preferences,
as described in [4], and (ii) a coalitional affinity game, as
described in [5].
In hedonic coalition formation games, agents’ preferences
for a given coalition are based on the other members of that
coalition [8]. Note that coalition games are necessarily one-
sided – agents care about the coalitions but the coalitions
cannot care about the agents. The most related work to ours
in this area is [4], where the authors show that when agents’
preferences over coalition are symmetric and additively sep-
arable (as the student utility functions in the housing assign-
ment problem are), a Nash (and individually) stable coali-
tion structure will always exist. This mimics the existence
result proved in Section 3, however our result applies for a
two-sided market.
Coalitional affinity games consider the pairwise relation-
ships between agents, as represented by a weighted graph
[5], and are a special subclass of hedonic games. The most
related result to the current work is [5], which proves a tight
upper bound on the Price of Anarchy using the notion of
core stability5 when the weighted graph is symmetric.
While the one-sided housing assignment problem and he-
donic coalition formation games appear to be very similar,
there are a number of key differences. Most importantly,
the housing assignment problem considers a fixed number
of houses with a limited number of spots available; stu-
dents cannot break away and form a new coalition/house,
nor can a house have more students than its quota. In addi-
tion, our model considers pairwise-stability, which is closest
to the Nash stability of [4], but is still significantly differ-
ent in that it involves a pair of students willing and able
to swap. Finally, each student gains utility from the house
they are matched with, in addition to the other members of
that house, which is different from the original formulation
of hedonic coalition games.
5.2 Discussion of results
To begin the discussion of our results, note that, as dis-
cussed in Section 3, the price of stability is 1 for our model
because any social welfare optimizing matching is stable.
However, the price of anarchy can be much larger than 1.
In fact, depending on the social network, the price of anar-
chy can be unboundedly large, as illustrated in the following
example.
Example 1 (Unbounded price of anarchy). Consider
a matching market with 4 students and 2 houses, each with
a quota of 2, and two possible matchings illustrated by Fig-
ure 3. As shown in Figure 3 (a) and (b), respectively, in
5A coalition structure is core stable if no set of agents can
break away and form a new coalition to improve their own
utility.
the optimal matching µ∗, W (µ∗) = k; whereas there exists
a pairwise-stable matching with W (µ) = 2. Thus, as k in-
creases, the price of anarchy grows linearly in k.
Despite the fact that, in general, there is a large efficiency
loss that results from enforcing stability, in many realistic
cases the efficiency loss is actually quite small. The following
two theorems provide insight into such cases.
A key parameter in these theorems is γ∗m which captures
how well the social network can be “clustered” into a fixed
number of m groups and is defined as follows.
γm(µ) :=
Ein(µ)
|E| (3)
γ∗m := max
µ
γm(µ) (4)
Thus, γ∗m represents the maximum edges that can be cap-
tured by a partition satisfying the house quotas. Note that
γ∗m is highly related to other clustering metrics, such as the
conductance [18], [32] and expansion [24].
Our first theorem regarding efficiency is for the “simple”
case of unweighted social networks with equal house quotas
and/or equivalently valued houses.
Theorem 3. Let w(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} for all students s, t and
let qh ≥ 2, Dh ∈ Z+ ∪ {0} for all houses h. If qh = q for all
h and/or Dh = D for all h, then
min
stable µ
W (µ) ≥ maxµW (µ)
1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m
We note that the requirement qh = q for all h and/or
Dh = D for all h is key to the proof of Theorem 3 and in
obtaining such a simple upper bound; otherwise, Theorem 4
applies.
Our second theorem removes the restrictions in the theo-
rem above, at the expense of a slightly weaker bound. De-
fine qmax = maxh∈H qh, wmax = maxs,t∈S w(s, t) and D∆ =
minh,g∈H(Dh − Dg), assuming that the houses are ordered
in increasing values of Dh.
Theorem 4. Let w(s, t) ∈ R+ ∪ {0} for all students s, t
and Dh ∈ R+ ∪ {0}, qh ∈ Z+ for all houses h, then
min
stable µ
W (µ) ≥ maxµW (µ)
1 + 2(m− 1)
(
γ∗m +
qmaxwmax
D∆
)
We omit the proofs of these theorems here for brevity; see
Appendix B for the details.
A first observation one can make about these theorems is
that the price of anarchy has no direct dependence on the
number of students. This is an important practical observa-
tion since the number of houses is typically small, while the
number of students can be quite large (similar phenomena
hold in many other many-to-one matching markets). In con-
trast, the theorems highlight that the degree of heterogene-
ity in quotas, network edge weights, and house valuations all
significantly impact inefficiency.
A second remark about the theorems is that the only de-
pendence on the social network is through γ∗m, which mea-
sures how well the graph can be “clustered” into m groups.
An important note about γ∗m is that it is highly dependent
on m, and tends to shrink quickly as m grows. We give an
illustration of this effect in Figures 4a and 4b using the two
social network data sets described in Section 4. A conse-
quence of this behavior is that the price of anarchy is not
actually linear in m in Theorems 3 and 4, as it may first
appear, it turns out to be sublinear. This is illustrated in
the context of real social network data in Figures 4c and 4d.
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Figure 4: Illustration of γ∗m and price of anarchy bounds in Theorem 3 for Caltech and Wikipedia networks.
Next, let us consider the impact of peer effects on the price
of anarchy. Considering the simple setting of Theorem 3, we
see that if there were no peer effects, this would be equivalent
to setting w(s, t) = 0 for all s, t. This would imply that
γ∗m = 0, and so the price of anarchy is one. Thus, another
interpretation of the price of anarchy in Theorem 3 is the
efficiency lost as a result of peer effects.
One final remark about Theorem 3 is that the bound pro-
vided is tight, as illustrated by the following example.
k edges
Di = 0 Dg = 0Dh = k + 1
Di = 0
Dg = 0
Dh = k + 1
k edges
k edges
k edges
k edges
k edges
Figure 5: Network that achieves PoA bound.
Example 2 (Tightness of Theorem 3). Consider a set-
ting with m houses and qh = mk for all h ∈ H. Students are
grouped into clusters of size k > 2, as shown for m = 3 in
Figure 5. The houses have Dh = k + 1 and Dg = Di = 0.
Each student in the middle cluster in each row has k edges to
the other students outside of their cluster (but none within),
as shown.
The worst-case stable matching is represented by the verti-
cal red lines. Note that since Dh = k+1, this matching is sta-
ble, even though all edges are cut. Thus minµ stable γm(µ) =
0. The optimal matching is represented by the horizontal blue
lines in the figure; note that γ∗m = 1. To calculate the price
of anarchy, we start from equations (6) and (7) and calculate
Q =
∑
h∈H qhDh
2E
=
mk(k + 1)
2mk(m− 1)k =
k + 1
2(m− 1)k ,
which gives,
maxµW (µ)
minstable µW (µ)
=
Q+ γ∗m
Q+ minµ stable γm(µ)
= 1 + 2(m− 1)
(
k
k + 1
)
.
Notice that as k becomes large, this approaches the bound of
1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m.
Though Theorem 3 is tight, it is unclear at this point
whether Theorem 4 is also tight. However, a slight modifica-
tion of the above example does show that it has the correct
asymptotics, i.e., there exists a family of examples that have
price of anarchy Θ(mγ∗mqmaxwmaxD
−1
∆ ).
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have focused on many-to-one matchings
with peer effects and complementarities. Typically, results
on this topic tend to be negative, either proving that sta-
ble matchings may not exist, e.g., [27, 29], or that stable
matchings are computationally difficult to find, e.g., [26].
In this paper, our goal has been to provide positive re-
sults. To this end, we focus on the case when peer effects
are the result of an underlying social network, and this re-
striction on the form of the peer effects allows us to prove
that a pairwise-stable matching always exists and that so-
cially optimal matchings are always stable. Further, we pro-
vide bounds on the maximal inefficiency (price of anarchy) of
any pairwise-stable matching and show how this inefficiency
depends on the clustering properties of the social network
graph. Interestingly, in our context the price of anarchy has
a dual interpretation as characterizing the degree of ineffi-
ciency caused by peer effects.
There are numerous examples of many-to-one matchings
where the results in this paper can provide insight; one of
particular interest to us is the matching of incoming un-
dergraduates to residential houses which happens yearly at
Caltech. Currently incoming students only report a pref-
erence order for houses, and so are incentivized to collude
with friends and not reveal their true preferences. For such
settings, the results in this paper highlight the importance
of having students report not only their preference order on
houses, but also a list of friends with whom they would like to
be matched. Using a combination of these factors the algo-
rithms and efficiency bounds presented in this paper provide
a promising approach, for this specific market as well as any
general market where peer effects change the space of stable
matchings.
The results in the current paper represent only a start-
ing point for research into the interaction of social networks
and many-to-one matchings. There are a number of simpli-
fying assumptions in this work which would be interesting
to relax. For example, the efficiency bounds we have proven
consider only a one-sided market, where houses do not have
preferences over students. Further, all the results in the pa-
per assume that all students have the same preference order
for the houses. These assumptions are key to the analysis
in this paper, and they certainly are valid in some matching
markets; however relaxing these assumptions would broaden
the applicability of the work greatly.
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APPENDIX
A. EXISTENCE PROOF
To prove Theorem 1, we first prove a technical lemma,
from which the theorem follows immediately. The analysis
is straightforward and draws its key ideas from the work of
[2], which considers only a one-sided market rather than the
two-sided market considered here.
Lemma 5. Any swap matching µts for which
(i) ∀ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)}, Ui(µts) ≥ Ui(µ), and
(ii) ∃ i ∈ {s, t, µ(s), µ(t)} with Ui(µts) > Ui(µ)
has W (µts) > W (µ).
Proof. Consider a matching µ and a swap matching µts
that satisfies (i) and (ii) from the lemma statement. Without
loss of generality, assume that student s strictly improves.
The other cases are symmetric. Define µ(s) = h, and µ(t) =
g. The change in utility for student s is then
0 < Us(µ
t
s)− Us(µ)
= Dg −Dh −
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(s, x) +
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(s, x)− w(s, t),
Similarly, for student t, we have
0 ≤ Ut(µts)− Ut(µ)
= Dh −Dg −
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x) +
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)− w(s, t).
Adding the above inequalities, we obtain the following:
0 <
∑
x∈µ(g)
(w(s, x)− w(t, x)) +
∑
x∈µ(h)
(w(t, x)− w(s, x))
− 2w(s, t)
:= δs,t
Continuing, the total change in utility for all students is:
∆S :=
∑
x∈S
Ux(µ
t
s)−
∑
x∈S
Ux(µ)
= δs,t +
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(x, s)− w(s, t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from s joining g
−
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(x, s)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss from s leaving h
+
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(x, t)− w(s, t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from t joining h
−
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(x, t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss from t leaving g
= 2δs,t (5)
> 0
where line (5) comes from the fact that we assume the social
network graph is symmetric.
On the house side of the market, we have
0 ≤ Uh(µts)− Uh(µ) + Ug(µts)− Ug(µ) := ∆H
as only houses h and g are affected by the swap and the
change in their utilities is non-negative by assumption. Thus,
the total social welfare strictly increases:
W (µts)−W (µ) = ∆S + ∆H > 0
Using Lemma 5 it is now easy to complete the proof of
Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let matching µ be a local maxi-
mum of W (µ). Lemma 5 shows that any swap matching that
is acceptable to all parties (i.e. satisfies conditions (i) and
(ii)) strictly increases the total social welfare. But this con-
tradicts the assumption that µ is a local maximum. Thus, µ
must be stable.
B. PROOFS OF POA THEOREMS
We note that these proofs hold for the one-sided market;
i.e., when Uh(µ) = 0 ∀h ∈ H. Also note that for ease of
notation, we use E instead of |E| to represent the total edge
weight of the graph in this appendix.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Throughout the proof we assume that the houses are or-
dered: i.e., if g < h then Dg < Dh. We begin by noting that
due to the assumption that
∑
h∈H Uh(µ) = 0,
W (µ) =
∑
s∈S
Us(µ) =
∑
h∈H
∑
s∈µ(h)
Dh + ∑
t∈µ(h)
w(s, t)

=
∑
h∈H
(qhDh + 2Ehh)
= 2Ein(µ) +
∑
h∈H
qhDh.
Thus,
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
=
Q+ maxµ γm(µ)
Q+ minstable µ γm(µ)
(6)
where
Q :=
∑
h∈H qhDh
2E
. (7)
Note that the parameter Q is independent of the particular
matching µ.
An important tool that we use throughout the proof is a
rephrasing of the definition of pairwise stability in the one-
sided market case in terms of a function α as follows.
Definition 4. Let αµ(s, g) be a function representing the
benefit a student s gains by moving to house g under match-
ing µ:
αµ(s, g) = Dg −Dµ(s) +
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(s, x)−
∑
x∈µ2(s)
w(s, x) (8)
Notice that using the definition above, given a specific
swap matching µts where t ∈ µ(g), we can calculate the dif-
ference in utility for the involved student s as
Us(µ
t
s)− Us(µ) = αµ(s, g)− w(s, t)
because
∑
x∈µts(g) w(s, x) =
∑
x∈µ(g) w(s, x)− w(s, t).
The definition of α also provides a useful new phrasing
of the definition of pairwise stability, which is equivalent to
that of Definition 3 when the market is one-sided, i.e, when
Uh(µ) = 0 ∀h ∈ H. Note that we are only considering the
Price of Anarchy for the one-sided market here – we plan to
generalize these results for the two-sided case in future work.
Definition 5. A matching µ is pairwise stable (PS) in
the one-sided (students-only) housing assignment market if
and only if for all pairs of students s ∈ µ(h) and t ∈ µ(g),
at least one of the following conditions holds:
Condition 1: s doesn’t want to swap, i.e., αµ(s, g) < w(s, t).
Condition 2: t doesn’t want to swap, i.e., αµ(t, h) < w(s, t).
Condition 3: s and t are indifferent, i.e., αµ(s, g) =
αµ(t, h) = w(s, t).
Using the above rephrasing of the definition of pairwise
stability, we now continue with the proof of Theorem 3. In
order to prove an upper bound on the price of anarchy, we
prove a lower bound on γm(µ) when µ is stable. To prove this
lower bound, we first prove an upper bound on the number
of cross edges (Ehg = Egh) in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let w(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} for all students s, t and let
qh ≥ 2, Dh ∈ Z∗ for all h. Let qh = q for all h and/or
Dh = D for all h. If a matching µ is stable, then for all
houses h and g,
Ehg ≤ max(qh(Dh−Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh +Egg) (9)
Proof. Using the conditions of stability from Definition
5 and Lemmas 10 and 11 as summarized below and proved
in Appendix C, we have
Case 1: If there exists s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > 1 then,
by Lemma 10, if µ is stable it follows that
Egh ≤ qg(Dg −Dh) + 2Egg
Case 2: If there exists t ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) > 1 then,
by Lemma 10, if µ is stable it follows that
Ehg ≤ qh(Dh −Dg) + 2Ehh
Case 3: If there does not exist s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) >
1 and there does not exist t ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) > 1
then, by Lemma 11, if µ is stable it follows that
Ehg ≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
Given any matching µ in the student-only market, it must
fall into one of the three cases above. Thus, if µ is stable, it
follows that one of the three bounds above holds. Because
the edges are undirected, Ehg = Egh, we can combine the
three bounds to conclude that if µ is stable,
Ehg ≤ max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
Next, we use the above to prove a lower bound on γm(µ).
Lemma 7. Let w(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} and let qh ≥ 2, Dh ∈ Z∗
for all h. Let qh = q for all h and/or Dh = D for all h. If a
matching µ is stable, then
γm(µ) ≥ max
(
E −∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg)
(2m− 1)E , 0
)
(10)
Proof.
Ein(µ) = E −
∑
g<h
Egh
≥ E −
∑
g<h
(qh(Dh −Dg) + 2(Ehh + Egg)) (11)
= E − 2(m− 1)Ein(µ)−
∑
g<h
(qh(Dh −Dg))
where we have used the assumption that the houses are or-
dered in line (11). Solving for Ein(µ) gives
Ein(µ) ≥
E −∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg)
2m− 1 .
Thus,
γm(µ) =
Ein(µ)
E
≥ E −
∑
g<h qh(Dh −Dg)
(2m− 1)E .
Note that the above bound is only useful when the numerator
is positive; otherwise, the bound becomes negative. However,
it is immediate to see that γm(µ) ≥ 0 always, as Ein(µ) and
E are non-negative, which completes the proof.
Finally, we can complete the proof of Theorem 3 using the
above lemmas. There are two cases to consider, depending
on the value of E :
Case 1: E >
∑
g>h qh(Dh −Dg)
Plugging the bound from Lemma 7 into (6) gives
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
=
Q+ γ∗m
Q+ γm(µ)
≤
∑
h∈H qhDh
2E
+γ∗m∑
h∈H qhDh
2E
+
E−∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)
(2m−1)E
=
(2m−1)∑h∈H qhDh+2(2m−1)Eγ∗m
(2m−1)∑h∈H qhDh+2E−2∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)
Using Lemma 12 from the Appendix to substitute for
∑
h∈H qhDh
is then enough to complete the proof in this case, after some
algebra using the fact that γ∗m ≤ 1.
Case 2: E ≤∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg)
In this case, Lemma 7 states that γm(µ) ≥ 0. Using this
bound and plugging into (6) gives
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
=
Q+ γ∗m
Q+ γm(µ)
≤ 1 + γ
∗
m
Q
(12)
Note that Q > 0 as long as E > 0 because we are given
that E ≤∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg) in this case. Further, note that
the case of E = 0 is trivial because all matchings have the
same welfare and so the price of anarchy is 1.
Using E ≤∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg) we have
Q ≥
∑
h∈H qhDh
2
∑
g<h qh(Dh −Dg)
. (13)
Combining (12) and (13) and again using Lemma 12 from
the appendix is then enough to complete the proof in this
case, after some algebra.
One final remark about this proof is that in the special
case of Dh = 0 a tighter bound holds. Specifically, the price
of anarchy is bounded by (2m− 1)γ∗m in this case.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4 follows the same structure as the
proof of Theorem 3, with a few added complexities that cause
the bound to become weaker.
To begin, we again derive a bound on the cross-edges.
Lemma 8. Let w(s, t) ∈ R∗ for all students s, t and let
Dh ∈ R∗ for all houses h. If a matching µ is stable, then for
all houses h and g,
Ehg ≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
+ qmaxwmax.
Proof. Using the conditions of stability from Definition
5 for the one-sided market and Lemmas 13 and 14 from Ap-
pendix C, we have three cases.
Case 1: If there exists s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > w(s, t)
for all t ∈ µ(g) then, by Lemma 13, if µ is stable, it follows
that
Egh ≤ qg(Dg −Dh) + 2Egg + qgwmax.
Case 2: If there exists t ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) > w(s, t)
for all s ∈ µ(h) then, by Lemma 13, if µ is stable, it follows
that
Ehg ≤ qh(Dh −Dg) + 2Ehh + qhwmax.
Case 3: If there does not exist s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) >
w(s, t) and there does not exist t ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) >
w(s, t), for all t ∈ µ(g), s ∈ µ(h) respectively, then, by
Lemma 14, if µ is stable, it follows that
Ehg ≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
+ qmaxwmax.
Given any matching µ, it must fall into one of the three
cases above. Thus, if µ is pairwise-stable, it follows that
one of the three bounds above holds. Because the edges are
undirected, Ehg = Egh, we can combine the three bounds to
conclude that, if µ is stable,
Ehg ≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
+ qmaxwmax
Next, we use the above to prove a lower bound on γm(µ).
Lemma 9. Let w(s, t) ∈ R∗. If a matching µ is stable,
then
γm(µ) ≥ max
(
E−∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−(m2 )qmaxwmax
(2m−1)E , 0
)
Proof.
Ein(µ) = E −
∑
g<h
Egh
≥ E −
∑
g<h
(qh(Dh −Dg) + 2(Ehh + Egg) + qmaxwmax)
(14)
= E − 2(m− 1)Ein(µ)−
∑
g<h
(qh(Dh −Dg))
−
(
m
2
)
qmaxwmax
where line (14) follows from the assumption that the houses
are ordered.
Solving for Ein(µ) gives
Ein(µ) ≥ E−
∑
g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−(m2 )qmaxwmax
2m−1 ,
and thus
γm(µ) =
Ein(µ)
E
≥ E−
∑
g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−(m2 )qmaxwmax
(2m−1)E .
This bound is only relevant when E >
∑
g>h qh(Dh−Dg)+(
m
2
)
qmaxwmax. Otherwise, the bound becomes negative, in
which case we use the fact that γm(µ) ≥ 0 always, as Ein(µ)
and E are non-negative.
Finally, we can complete the proof of Theorem 4 using the
lemmas above. There are two cases to consider, depending
on the value of E.
Case 1: E >
∑
g<h qh(Dh −Dg) +
(
m
2
)
qmaxwmax
Plugging the bound from Lemma 9 into (6) gives
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
=
Q+ γ∗m
Q+ γm(µ)
≤
∑
h∈H qhDh
2E
+γ∗m∑
h∈H qhDh
2E
+
E−∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−(m2 )qmaxwmax
(2m−1)E
=
(2m−1)∑h∈H qhDh+2(2m−1)Eγ∗m
(2m−1)∑h∈H qhDh+2E−2∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−2(m2 )qmaxwmax
Using Lemma 12 to substitute for
∑
h∈H qhDh, the bound
becomes, after some algebra,
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
≤ (1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m)×(
2(m−1)E+∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)
2(m−1)E+∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)−2(m−1)(m2 )qmaxwmax
)
.
Using E ≥∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg) + (m2 )qmaxwmax, we have,
after some algebra,
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
≤ (1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m)
(
1 +
2(m−1)(m2 )qmaxwmax
(2m−1)∑g<h qh(Dh−Dg)
)
.
Case 2: E ≤∑g<h qh(Dh −Dg) + (m2 )qmaxwmax
In this case, Lemma 9 states that γm(µ) ≥ 0. Using this
bound and plugging into (6), we have
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
=
Q+ γ∗m
Q+ γm(µ)
≤ 1 + γ
∗
m
Q
.
Using E ≤∑g<h q(Dh −Dg) + (m2 )qmaxwmax we have
Q ≥
∑
h∈H qhDh
2
∑
g<h qh(Dh −Dg) + 2
(
m
2
)
qmaxwmax
.
and so the price of anarchy becomes, again using Lemma 12,
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
≤ 1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m +
2
(
m
2
)
qmaxwmax∑
h∈H qhDh
.
We can combine the two cases into one (looser) bound,
maxµW (µ)
minµ is stable W (µ)
≤ 1 + 2(m− 1)γ∗m + 2(m− 1)qmaxwmax
D∆
.
C. TECHNICAL LEMMAS
This appendix includes the lemmas used in the proofs of
Theorems 3 and 4.
Lemma 10. Let w(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} for all students s, t and
let Dh ∈ Z∗ for all h. Let µ be a stable matching. If there
exists a student s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > 1 for some
other house g, then Egh ≤ qg(Dg −Dh) + 2Egg.
Proof. Since µ is stable, then for all t ∈ µ(g), (s, t) must
satisfy at least one of the three conditions stated in the def-
inition of pairwise stability (Definition 5). However, for all
t ∈ µ(g),
αµ(s, g) > 1 ≥ w(s, t).
Thus, (s, t) cannot satisfy conditions 1 or 3. Therefore, it
must satisfy condition 2, which implies that for all t ∈ µ(g)
αµ(t, h) < w(s, t) ≤ 1.
Since Dh, w(s, t) ∈ Z∗ we have that αµ(t, h) ∈ Z∗, and so
αµ(t, h) < 1 =⇒ αµ(t, h) ≤ 0, ∀ t ∈ µ(g).
Summing over all t ∈ µ(g) gives∑
t∈µ(g)
αµ(t, h) ≤ 0.
Using the definition of α, we have
∑
t∈µ(g)
Dh −Dg + ∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)−
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x)
 ≤ 0.
Simplifying the above yields
qg(Dh −Dg) + Egh − 2Egg ≤ 0,
from which the desired bound follows.
Lemma 11. Let w(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} for all students s, t, and
let Dh ∈ Z∗ for all houses h. Let µ be a stable matching and
let qh = q ≥ 2 and/or Dh = D ∈ Z∗ for all h. If (i) there
does not exist an s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > 1 and (ii)
there does not exists a ∈ µ(g) such that αµ(t, h) > 1, then
Ehg ≤ max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg)
Proof. It follows from the assumptions in the theorem
statement that the students in houses h and g can be parti-
tioned into 6 sets based on their house and α values (either
1, 0, or negative), as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Partition of students based on α function
Let S0, S1, and S−1 denote the set of students in house
h such that αµ(s, g) = 0, αµ(s, g) = 1, and αµ(s, g) ≤ −1
respectively. For convenience, we use the same notation for
the set and the number of students in the set, e.g., |S1| = S1
The same conventions apply to the T variables and students
in house g. Two sets are connected with a black line in
Figure 6 if all students in one set must be connected to all
students in the other set. These connections follow from
the conditions of stability in Definition 5. This gives us 3
constraints:
1. if αµ(s, g) = 1 and αµ(t, h) = 1 then w(s, t) = 1
2. if αµ(s, g) = 1 and αµ(t, h) = 0 then w(s, t) = 1
3. if αµ(s, g) = 0 and αµ(t, h) = 1 then w(s, t) = 1
These constraints give us a lower bound on the edges be-
tween houses h and g.∑
t∈µ(g)
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x) ≥ S1T1 + S1T0 + S0T1 (15)
To prove the theorem, we want to find an upper bound on
the cross edges, Ehg, so we relate the edges in the graph to
the sum of the α values using the definition of the α function.∑
s∈µ(h)
αµ(s, g) = qh(Dg −Dh) + Ehg − 2Ehh (16)
Since the students in each house are partitioned by their
α values, we can bound this sum as:∑
s∈µ(h)
αµ(s, g) ≤ S1 − S−1 (17)
Combining (16) and (17) gives
Ehg ≤ qh(Dh −Dg) + 2Ehh + S1 − S−1 (18)
To continue, we need to find an upper bound on the quan-
tity S1 − S−1. To do this, we start by lower bounding Egg.
2Egg =
∑
t∈µ(g)
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x)
Recalling the definition of α in (8) gives∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x) = Dh −Dg +
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)− αµ(t, h).
Combining the previous two equations yields
2Egg =
∑
t∈µ(g)
Dh −Dg + ∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)− αµ(t, h)

=qg(Dh −Dg) +
∑
t∈µ(g)
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)−
∑
t∈µ(g)
αµ(t, h).
Using inequalities (15) and (17) gives
S1T1 +S1T0 +S0T1−(T1−T−1) ≤ 2Egg+qg(Dg−Dh) (19)
We can now use the above to find an upper bound on
S1 − S−1. To do this, we relate the left hand side of the
above inequality to S1 − S−1.
Specifically, let f(S1, S0, S−1, T1, T0, T−1) = S1T1 +S1T0 +
S0T1 − T1 + T−1 − (S1 − S−1). It is possible to show using
elementary techniques that this function is non-negative, and
thus that
S1 − S−1 ≤ S1T1 + S1T0 + S0T1 − T1 + T−1 (20)
We omit the details for brevity. Note, however that the
inequality in (20) holds only for the case where qh = q for
all h ∈ H. In the case where the quotas are not equal but
Dh = D for all h ∈ H, the proof technique differs slightly, but
still yields S1 − S−1 ≤ 2Egg, from which the result follows.
Finally, combining (19) and (20) gives
S1 − S−1 ≤ S1T1 + S1T0 + S0T1 − T1 + T−1
≤ 2Egg + qg(Dg −Dh)
To complete the proof we now plug the above into (18) to
get
Ehg ≤qh(Dh −Dg) + 2Ehh + 2Egg + qg(Dg −Dh)
≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh)) + 2(Ehh + Egg).
where the final step follows from noting that at most one of
Dh −Dg and Dg −Dh is strictly positive.
Lemma 12.∑
g<h∈H qh(Dh −Dg)∑
h∈H qhDh
≤ m− 1
Proof. Without loss of generality assume the houses are
ordered so that if g < h, then Dg < Dh. The following
inequalities hold simply because qh, qg, Dh, Dg are all non-
negative values.∑
g<h∈H qh(Dh −Dg)∑
h∈H qhDh
≤
∑
g<h∈H(qhDh + qgDg)∑
h∈H qhDh
≤
∑
h∈H
∑
g 6=h∈H qhDh∑
h∈H qhDh
=
∑
h∈H(m− 1)qhDh∑
h∈H qhDh
= m− 1
The remaining lemmas parallel the above lemmas, but are
used for proving Theorem 4, and thus apply in more general
settings.
Lemma 13. Let w(s, t) ∈ R∗ for all students s, t, and let
Dh ∈ R∗ for all h ∈ H. Consider a stable matching µ. If
there exists an s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > w(s, t) for all
t ∈ µ(g), then Egh < qg(Dg −Dh) + 2Egg + qgwmax.
Proof. By assumption, there exists a student in h that
strictly wants to swap with any student in house g. It then
follows from the stability of µ that all students in g must
strictly oppose the swap (i.e., αµ(t, h) < w(s, t)). This gives
Dh −Dg +
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)−
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x) < w(s, t) < wmax,
for all t ∈ µ(g). Summing the above equation over t ∈ µ(g)
then yields
qg(Dh −Dg) + Egh − 2Egg < qgwmax
Rearranging the previous equation completes the proof.
Lemma 14. Let w(s, t) ∈ R∗ for all students s, t, and let
Dh ∈ R∗ for all h ∈ H. Consider a stable matching µ. If (i)
there does not exist an s ∈ µ(h) such that αµ(s, g) > w(s, t)
for all t ∈ µ(g) and (ii) there does not exist t ∈ µ(g) such
that αµ(t, h) > w(s, t) for all s ∈ µ(h), then
Ehg ≤max(qh(Dh −Dg), qg(Dg −Dh))
+ 2(Ehh + Egg) + qmaxwmax
Proof. Conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent to requiring
∀s ∈ µ(h), Dg −Dh +
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(s, x)
−
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(s, x) ≤ w(s, t) ∀t ∈ µ(g)
and
∀t ∈ µ(g), Dh −Dg +
∑
x∈µ(h)
w(t, x)
−
∑
x∈µ(g)
w(t, x) ≤ w(s, t) ∀s ∈ µ(h)
To complete the proof we simply sum these two bounds using
w(s, t) ≤ wmax and Egh = Ehg.
